It was understandable, even if unadvisable, for Ankara to put its weight behind the Syrian uprising when largely peaceful Sunni protests first erupted in the countryside. The Arab Spring was in full force; history was turning a new leaf. Tunisia and Egypt had been epic revolutions, at least initially. Libya was more tragic. But even if it diverged from the narrative, it allowed outside powers a manner of relevance and, more importantly, set the NATO precedent for long-time non-conformists. Syria did, for all intents and purposes, seem next. And Erdogan wanted to be on the right side of history.
But despite initial military defections, and increasing momentum of the rebellion, and the wolf-at-the-door press frenzy when rebels stormed Damascus suburbs, Assad did not fall. And if not foreseeing the uprising attracting hordes of Al Qaeda jihadists was Erdogan’s first miscalculation—which could be overlooked considering the tide turning so swiftly against Damascus—failure to revise his initial position once Qatar and Saudi Arabia emerged as the rebellion’s main sponsors amounted to a very serious misreading of the regional calculus.
It meant a number of things. One, it was a tacit endorsement of sectarianising of the conflict. GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) patrons have used jihadi proxies since the success of the anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan, and Erdogan was no stranger to their intolerance of all things non-Wahabi. Two, unwilling to address his initial misreading, he embraced the ‘my enemy’s enemy’ approach, implying a clear position in the growing divide within the Middle East—Iran-Syria-Iraq versus the Saudi centric GCC. Three, the more the anti-Iran front aligned GCC and Turkish interests with US, EU and Israel’s, Erdogan counted on his bridge with Israel to play the lead role as Syria descended into bloody civil war. And four, he counted on NATO’s all-for-one stipulation to protect him from any blowback from the Syrian front. Almost all assumptions have proved wrong. And it’s been all downhill for some time now.
Once the war entered a prolonged stalemate, it was inevitable for it to spill over into neighbouring countries. And it came to Turkey last month, with the twin car bombings in the border town of Reyhanli, something NATO’s patriot batteries could do nothing about. Even if Ankara’s suspicions of Syrian government involvement are true—and that’s a big if—they only add to Erdogan’s miscalculations. No doubt Damascus will respond to Turkish support for the rebels, but it will not require Assad to order a scud barrage across the border. It will be hits like Reyhanli’s, featuring attacks against soft targets, endangering Turkish civilians and turning public opinion against the AKP.
Yet Erdogan’s kneejerk reaction, holding Assad squarely responsible, probably misses the mark, again. Turkish opposition leader Mehmet Ali Ediboglu of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) rightly cautioned that the attacked bore the fingerprints of Al Qaeda more than the Assad regime’s, and was most probably the work of Jabhat al Nusra, the most active, and successful, of the Syrian opposition, and whose members regularly funnel into Syria through Reyhanli. [1] The Syrian side is an established Nusra stronghold, with no chance of government intelligence driving explosive laden cars across the border. Ediboglu believes the hit was carried out by Jabhat al Nusra to drag Turkey into the war, especially since the Syrian government has made impressive gains of late, and the international community has yet to overcome its paralysis regarding rebel aid.
Then, just as protests against Turkey’s increasing involvement in the Syrian war erupted in parts of the country—at times leading to tear gassing—Erdogan faced more disappointment in Washington. Hoping to press for increased US engagement, he came back endorsing the UN Geneva initiative, after initially dismissing it as not enough. [2] Of course, Obama agreed with the need to overcome “Assad’s tyranny,” but beyond the rhetoric differences are clearly growing, and Erdogan feels he is not getting enough in return for hosting tens of thousands of refugees, backing the FSA, and tolerating Al Qaeda fighters pouring across Turkey’s borders. His steps banked on quick capitulation of the Assad regime, but once that did not happen, there was clearly no Plan B.
Three years into the Syrian uprising, Erdogan’s personal calculations have played no small part in emboldening radical militias and strengthening Saudi designs in a country as geopolitically significant as Syria. He has increased divisions within Turkey and opposition to his continuous meddling in the new Levantine tragedy is growing. The Reyhanli attack proves that, one way or the other, the war will now come to the Turkish people also. And if al Nusra was really behind the attack, which is very likely, then he will also realise that the jihadi monster he helped turn towards Syria is an uncontrollable menace that will not thank Ankara and go home once Damascus falls.
For some time, commentators have questioned Erdogan’s increasing tilt towards authoritarianism, his disregard of opinions that differ from his own, and his desire to take Turkey back to its old Ottoman relevance. But claiming to champion the people’s choices while hopping aboard the Saudi bandwagon typify the contradictions his political outlook has begun assuming. Inside Turkey, as public opinion turns against him, he no longer commands the goodwill that his Davos snub to Ariel Sharon and later flotilla initiative earned him. And outside, especially in Syria, his choices have helped bring death, destruction and chaos. Rather than raise himself, and Turkey, to imperial heights, his policy stance has turned out more delusional than calculated, bringing important lessons in blowback he will do well to learn from.
(1) Turkish MP blames Al Nusra for border town attack, The National, May 14, 2013
(2) Turkey adjusts its Syria policy, Al-Monitor, May 19, 2013
Shahab Jafry is Middle East Correspondent for Pakistan Today and can be reached at jafry.shahab@gmail.com.
