The Middle East is changing forever

Enough about Hezbollah’s presence in Qusayr, please. Of course the Syrian opposition and their sponsors didn’t expect Hezbollah to stay away, not the least because the US, EU, GCC and Turkey turned a blind eye to, if not actually facilitated, thousands of al Qaeda jihadis from about 40 countries pouring into Syria in their two-and-a-half year bid to unseat Bashar al Assad. The uproar is more frustration than concern.

The Syrian government has made impressive gains over the last few weeks. And Qusayr is just as symbolic as strategic. It has shut rebel smuggling routes from Lebanon after more than a year and shielded the Alawite heartland on the Mediterranean, besides opening the front north to Homs, Hama, all the way to Aleppo.

Talk of a heroic last rebel stand in face of superior opposition, too, was more exaggeration than fact. It was one of the best-fortified strongholds of the opposition. And considering the slow nature of urban warfare—where buildings have to be ‘cleansed’ one by one—the delay was inevitable. But perhaps most importantly, it signified a new, more effective form of counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy on part of the government, and confirmed the growing momentum, and therefore confidence, of the regime. It has also brought the collapse of the Syrian National Council (SNC) that much closer. [1]

But that is still not the biggest surprise facing Assad’s enemies.

It is now clear that the opposition coalition was convinced of a quick collapse of the regime. Month after month, both Western and Gulf media outlets warned of an imminent fall of the government in Damascus. Even al Jazeera, despite its hard earned reputation of no-nonsense reporting, found it more suitable to parrot the Qatari government’s line. Yet the longer Assad survived, the more it became apparent that the opposition had no Plan B.

Now, with the war in its third year, and finally spilling over into Lebanon (Tripoli) and Turkey (Reyhanli), and al Qaeda’s Jabhat al Nusra by far the strongest of on-ground rebel factions, one of the strangest ironies of modern Middle East geopolitics is at play. Its first signs were seen recently when rebel forces briefly overran the Golan border crossing in Quneitra.

Suddenly faced with al Qaeda presence at its borders, and Austrians abandoning Undof, the Israelis quickly realized that the four-decade lull at the Golan, holding since the Americans and Soviets brokered the post Yom Kippur war arrangement, would unravel if the rebels bolstered their presence at the border. Sections of the international media reported that the Israelis all but mobilized a preemptive crossover but held back once Assad’s troops retook the post. [2]

It seems that more than two years of war to rid Israel of one of its most potent adversaries has placed a far bigger enemy right at its gate. And while the Ba’athists caused few problems at the border—despite their material and moral support to Iran and Hezbollah—al Qaeda is not likely to be as accommodating in case Syria is partitioned, which is what will happen if arms and petrodollars continue to pour across its borders.

This may well mark a shift in opposition tactics from here, forcing a serious recalibration in Tel Aviv. There has been diplomatic discomfort in the West regarding Wahabi militia advances, but nothing forceful enough to put the FSA in a stronger position. Plans to ensure arms end up in more secular hands, too, have fizzled out for lack of a viable mechanism on the battlefield. And since the region’s petro monarchies have funded and armed Wahabi fighters since the beginning of the uprising, there are signs that all is not well in opposition circles with regard to future plans.

The Turkish Spring, of sorts, does not help matters either. Tens of thousands have not taken to the streets there just because Erdogan decided to chop down some trees in central Istanbul. The revolt manifests discontent of which his Syria policy is a central part. The Turks have never backed his megalomaniac plans of echoing Saudi calls of turning Arabia into Wahabistan. And while Erdogan Pasha is humbled by a dose of blowback lessons, Ankara will have to take the back seat in the proxy war.

Israel seems far closer than the US of realizing that for all its faults, the Ba’athist Mukhabbarat state of the Assads was a far lesser thorn in their side than al Qaeda is posturing to be. Few things will please it more than Hezbollah and al Nusra bleeding each other, but in the long run it will realize that it has something in common with the old enemy, and that is a far bigger new enemy. Hezbollah’s formal entry in the Syrian civil war might just be the game changer that keeps a lid on the monster, and keeps it away from Israel. The Middle East is changing forever.

Notes

[1] Defeat widens opposition split, The National, June 9, 2013
[2] Israel reacts angrily to Austria’s withdrawal from Golan Heights, The Guardian, June 6, 2013

Shahab Jafry is Middle East Correspondent for Pakistan Today and can be reached at jafry.shahab@gmail.com.